A graphical simulator for the cryptanalysis of block ciphers by Boztas, S et al.
' A Graphical Simulator for the Cryptanalysis of 
Black. Ciphers - .  . . : ,  . . .  
. .  
Serdar Bozta?, Asha  Rao, Bindi Maru and Thanh Tran  . .  
> 
. .  
Department of Mathematics and Statistics 
School of Mathematical and Geospatial Sciences . .  . . .  
RMIT University . , . , . . 
GPOBox2476V, Melbourne , . . . ... , 
serdar.hoztas@ems.rmit.edu.au .. :. 
Victoria 3001, Australia 
: ' 1  
. I  . .  . .  . .  1.1 ,,- .. . 
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION itself. The input block is calledplairitextand the output block is 
called ciphertext. K is a secret key ihat determines which 
permutation is chosen. In DES' case K is 56.bits long. The 
technical details on the. inner workings of DES are widely 
available-just type DES on Google.'or see Stinson 121 for 
example-and will not be considered any further here. Suffice . 
it to sayshat  it is b a s d o n  the idea of mixing a number of 
simple functions to obtain a 'very.complex one, where it is 
extremely difficult to guess the input block.given the output 
block, without the knowledge of the key. 
DES has heen extensively tested and used for the last 25 
We have designed and implemented a graphical simulator 
for the use of students in the Master of Applied Science 
(Information Security) program at RMTT University in 
Melbourne, Australia: During this process; a lot of practical 
experience was gained which will aid future designers who 
address similar problems, especially if the design aims include ' 
the realistic simulation, in a reasonable time. of a process- 
here, cryptanalysis-which often takes many days or weeks of 
computation by powerful computers. 
. 
11. BACKGROUND ON CRYPTANALYSIS 
The etymological dictionaries define cpptographg as the art 
of szcret writing, which can be termed secret communications 
in the context of our electronic age. There is a distinction 
hetween .siirreptirioiis communications-the formal term is 
stegaiiograpliy-and cryptography. In steganography, the 
opponent does not even notice that the communication has 
taken place, while in cryptography, all the opponent sees is 
gibberish, a random sequence of characters or numbers, which 
is undecipherable without some extra information. 
Here; we focus exclusively on secret key ciphers-where a 
shared secret needs Lo be established between the transmitter 
and receiver. The history of such ciphers is thousands of years 
old, hut the real scientific history is quite young, only about 
300 years old. We will ignore all this history and move. to the 
1970s when the first publicly available block cipher-so 
named because it processes data in blocks-alled DES (Data 
Encryption Standard) was designed by IBM eniineers, in 
response to a request by the US government, specifically for 
non-governmental commercial use. The colourful history of 
DES and its aftermath is we!l-detailed.by S. Levy [ I ] ,  if in a 
somewhat partisan manner. 
The basic idea.behind a block cipher is the following: Data 
(text, image, etc.) is assumed to have been converted to binary 
format. This data is split into consecutive subblocks of equal 
size - in the case of DES, 64 bit or 8 byte blocks. Now, DES 
can  be^ thought of as being a collection of pseudorandom 
p e r m u t a t i h  F(K,X) which map the set of 64  bit vectors to 
" 
years or  so, with no catastrophic attacks exhibited.  its uses 
include, together with its upgraded cousin triple DES, financial 
transaction systems, banking and ATM networks. 
Clearly, one way of attacking.DES-or any block cipher- 
the so-called brute force arrack is the following: Try all 
possible keys (there are 2s6 of them) to decrypt awencrypted 
message and see if what-you get is gibberish or not. This is a 
simplification, of course. The strength of DES is defined to  be 
256 since this is the. number of decryption operations that will 
break it with probability 1. Of course, if we're happy with a 
probability of Yz then half as many operations will suffice. 
There have been two "successful" attacks on DES since its 
design-at least these are the only ones in the open literature. 
One is termed differential cr)prana!ysis and the other linear 
cn'pplanalyis [3]. The main.  thrust of the attacks is to 
demonstrate that less than 256 operations, in this case . 
etrcryptions, sitflce ro discover the secret key. However, the 
damage is limited by the fact that.the better of these attacks, 
namely linear cryptanalysis, will.hreak DES in, 243 operations 
with a kiiown plaintext attack. This meansthat the attacker has 
a set of 2'j unciphered blocks with the corresponding ciphered 
blocks, all under the same secret key. TI&, is: not just an 
academic attack, however, if one thinks of the,high data rates- 
in today's communication sysiems accumulating 2" blocks is 
the same as accumulating 2'6 bytes or 256 Terabytes. 
- 
- 
111. DESIGN OF THE SIMULATOR 
In the' design of the simulator, we needed to find a scaled 
down block cipher: the one.designed by Heys [4] fits the bill. 
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This takes in blocks of 16 bits (2 bytes) and i t  is actually 
practical to base a simulator on. Its design principle is 
somewhat different than DES, as it is an SPN (Substitution 
Permutation Network) instead of a Feistel .Network. However 
this design is even more relevant toddy, Since the new AES 
(Advanced Encryption Standard), which has 128 bits of key 
and was .selected b y  international competition, is based on an 
SPN as well. 
The block diagram of the block cipher is shown in Figure 1, 
as it appears to the user of our program. The encryption 
1 function is a sequence of 4 rounds. In each round, the input 
binary vector is XORed with the round key and then fed into 
four nonlinear Sboxes '(substitution boxes) each processing 4 
hits. The output of the Sboxes is passed'through a permutation 
layei and the output of the permutation layer forms the output 
of that round. There is a fifth key which is XORed with the 
output of round 4 and this.forms the output of the cipher. 
Linear cryptanalysis works bn the principle of replacing the 
.nonlinear substitution boxes by linear expressions (over the 
finite field of 2 elements'and its extensions) and combining 
these expressions to get an equation for the unknown key bits 
. .we ar<targeting. This equation is then tested with guessed key 
. bits and its bias compared to the experimental bias predicted by 
the theory. If the guess is wrong the'bias'will be very nearly 
zero while'if the guess is right tKe'bias will be, say I in 215, 
which of couise requires. lots of plaintextlciphertext pairs to 
. 
possible since all arithmetic is modulo 2. If a = (l,O,O,l) and b 
= (l,l,O,O) the equation becomes 
4 4 
cap; = C b j S ( x ) j  
i=l i=1 
or 
x ,  + x ,  =S(x),  +S(X)?. 
The input to an Sbox has XORing by key bits, so the above 
equation would become 
The output bits from the Sbox are then passed through the 
permutation layer, therefore the same bits appear at the input of 
other Sboxes. 
x , + k , + x , + k ,  =S(x),+S(x), 
Contbinini different mimiss: If the Sbox approximated by the 
values of a and b given above was S, , then its 1" and 
output bits would become the first input bits to Sboxes sl,  and 
&as  it can be~seen from Fig. 1. This now means that the 
cryptanalyst needs to use linear approximations involving only 
the first input hit of those Shoxes. Then, the linear 
approximations can .he added together to the original one, 
which leads to intermediate bits caneding in modulo 2 
arithmetic. The missing ingredient in the completion of this 
analvsis is given bv the d i n e  U D  lemma. which tells us the 
Y L . I .  
overall bias of the sum of a set of equations, in terms of the 
biases of the individual equations, assuming stat~sr;cal 
independmce is,not, however, a bad 
assumption, since there are key bits mixed in hetween sboxes 
in different layers. The piling up lemma used by Matsui [3] in 
his linear dryplanalysis of DES states~that the equation 
detect. 
To explain. this-better consider one Of the Sboxes in our 
cipher. It is a nonlinear mapping.converting 4 input hits to 4 
output bits. Therefdre, i t ~ h a s J 6  possible inputs and 16 possible 
  out puts. If the mapping is S(x), then the Sbox input and output 
satisfy the equation S(x)=y for all inputs x in the s e m f  4 bit 
vectors. We now consider replacing this equation with a linear 
the Sboxes, 
equation. i.e., an equation of the form a ' X= b. S(x) where the 
dot product is computed modulo 2. For the particular choice of 
. .  
E = 2'~-~E1E2...E1,~. 
the constants'a and b. which are themselves 4,bit vectors, let 
the number of inputs x for which a. ' .x= b . ~  s(x) holds be 'holds, where the&, are the probabilistic biases (therefore 
:denoted N(a,bj. Now c6nsider the bias N(a,b)-8 as a and b 
(N(a,b)-8)/16 /s..used instead of N(a,b)-8. ) of individual vary over all pbssihle.values in the set of.~binary vectors of 
length.4. If the'Shox was linear, then the bias would be c8.for equations which in the bias 
-some choice of a and b. If the Shox was,affine. i.e., the 
complement bf a linear function, the hias'yould be ,8 for some 
choice of a 'and b.-However, these Shoxes are nonlinear and. 
have been designed very carefully. The best we can hbpe for in 
'  this case.is.10 determine the pair~(a,b) which givesthe largest 
.magnitude for the bias N(a,bJ-8. This will .mean that the 
We now describe a simplified linear Cr$dnslysis by 
considering a two-round version of the SPN cipher which is 
shown in Fig. 1. In this case, the ciphertext is taken to be the 
output of the Yd layer of Shoxes, after the permutation layer 
hut before the "siubkey K3 key mixing" as  shown in Fig. I .  Let 
. . . . . .  
. equation (I :.x=~b. S(x) is a' "best possible" approximation for . .  Some var'ables . .  
the,Sbox S. A table-Gf the hiasesrfor ali.choices of a and h, 
which .is called,the Linear Approximation Table, is computed 
and displayed by our simu1ator;as shown $Fig. 2. 
. 1 :' ~ . '  
.I  the next task of the cryptanalyst is to,combine the.linear 
approximationi  that. apply .io individual Shoxes in order to 
obtain a linear approximation that applies to the whole cipher. 
Two main points fieedto be emphasized about this task 
Incorpuraring.ke?. bits:?onsider the. a_pproximation given by 
a ' x= b. S(x) and write it in the form a . x+ b. S(x)=O: This is . .  . .  .. 
Let P,,P, ,..., c6 denote. the .plaintext bits and let 
C,,C z,...;Cl,denote the ciphertext bits of the 2 round. 
version of our SPN cipher. Let us also choose the convention 
that the subkey at the.input.to the l".round is denoted by 
Kl,l,Kl,z ,_._,  while the subkey at the input to the 2d 
round is denoted by K 2 , ! ,  K,, ,_.., K, , , ,  . Finally, let 
x;,l, Xi -?  ,_.., denote the input hits to the Shoxes in the 
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between successi;e rounds; see Fig. 3~ for an example- of a 
structure that uses a different permutation,to the original.one in .&2, : X2.6  = Y2.E + Y2,8 with bios 11/4 ~. . . .  
. .  
Fig. I. . .. . 
We can rewrite the approximation for the first.round Sbox as 
.S12.: P5 + KI,, +j7 + Kl,7 + P8 + Kl:, = Y,< 
follows IV. USE OF THE SIMULATOR : 
At the beginning of 'a "session, the user chooses the 
substitution mapping for the Shox as well as the permutation 
between the rounds, using dialog boxes. The choice of the 
Sbox mapping is as shown in Fig. 4. The user then chooses the 
, . .  . .  : ' . key hits for the 5 round keys and chooses how many trials the 
simulator should use, &shown in Fig. 5. The.simula1or.then 
displays a dialog box that indicates that it is performing the 
while reducing the cipher to 2 rounds means that ttie ciphertext cryptanalysis and generates random plaintexts, encrypts them 
bits and and the second round bits are identical. UP to under the given keys and then processes the obtained plaintext 
permutation, with the identifications ciphertext pairs in order to guess key bits. The simulator, 
Y2,, = C6 and Y2,8 = C,, . reports its results by means-of a display that shows the linear 
Substituting relationships into . the original approximations used and their biases, its guess for the key bits, 
as well as how long the analysis took. This is shown in Fig. 6. approximations gives the equations 
s12 ' f i  + '115 + '7 + '1.7 + '8 + '1.8 = ' 2 . 6  i- K ? . 6  It can take anywhere from a few'minutes to a few hours to give 
an answer as to the guessed key values. The theory is that if the 
since the input hits to that Sbox are the' plaintext hits XORed 
witli the corresponding bits 6f subkey KI .  Taking' account of 
the permutation layer at the output of the first rpund, gives the 
. relationship ., - .  , . .  
'1,; = ' 2 ; 6  + K2;6 ' . . 
.~ 
s, : x, A = c, + c,, _ _  .. I _  
with the Same biases as before, If we add these 
together; we obtain the equation below 
'3 + '7 + '8.' '1.5 + '1.7 + '1.8 + K 2 . i  + ' 6  "1, = 
overall bias is & then approximately &-2 trials are requiied 
for a reliable guess for the key bits. The students have.found 
the simulator a useful educational tool to use which helps them 
understand abstract .concern. eswciallv by allowinn them to . .  
which has overall bias 
cryptanalytic experiment then proceeds in the following way. 
2(-1/4)(1/4) = -1/8. The repeat the cryptanalysis, changing one parameter at ;time and 
seeing the effect. For example, they can observe how many key 
bits can be reliably guessed as a function of the number of 
"plaintextlciphertext pairs generated by the simulator. . .  
Let us assume that we will treat the key bit K2:,as an 
unknown constant. Let us encode a large number of random V. IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS 
plaintexts with the two round SPN cipher whose key bits are 
unknown. and pair these plaintexts with the corresponding 
ciphertexts. Let us then ,  try to guess the key bits 
'!Kl,s ~ K,, , Kl,s .  For each of the 8 possible combinations for 
these key bits, we observe the fraction of the total-number of 
trials for which the above equation 
Pi + P,'+ P8 + KI,, + Kl,7 + KI,$ + C, + C,, = 0 
(without the unknown key bi< K2,6 1 holds. Since we removed 
the bit K2,,'from the previous equation. we now may actually 
have 'bias either +1/8 or its negative, for the correct 
combination of the guessed key bits. Thus, we consider the 
most likely value of the key bits 'l,s,Kl,7, Kl,8 that value 
which has the largest bias away from 0, since die expected bias 
for a wrong combination of key bits is zero by assumption- 
this is calledthe, l iymrhesis rrfwroiig key rqtiivaleiice. 
. .  
In order to complete the' tdsk over a short time (one 
semester), the following design approach was used: The task 
was divided into two main parts: computation and GUI and 
combined later on to produce a final product. 
Each attack consists of four attempts: attacking Sbox S1 I.. 
S12, S13, S14. For each of round 2 and round 3, the program 
will use the linear approximation(s) with highest bias by 
searching all possible Sbox linear approximations. 
The results include the guessed key hits of round 5 ,  the 
linear approximations used with corresponding bias and time 
taken to complete the task. 
The two-person team of students who did the programming, 
Maru and Tran, agreed to divide their tasks so that Tran would 
be responsible for the CUI design and implementation, while 
MaN would be responsible for the computation part. They also 
decided IO use C for the programming task as C is the standard 
for implementation of ciphers. C is an extremely flexible, 
expressive and terse programming language. Microsoft Visual 
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C++ V6.0 was used for coding the CUI so that it was possible 
to combine the two parts together without too many problems. 
The present progrdmfsoftware can be further improved by: 
a. Allowing the user to input the Sbox approximations 
instead of having the software select the one with the highest 
probability bias 
b. Displaying the flow of bits when implementing the attack 
with the given approximations and thereby show the active 
Sboxes and which key bits will be recovered 
c. Adding. on . Differential Cryptanalysis to provide a 
complete implementation of the paper by Heys [41. 
I VI. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, the design and use of a graphical simulator for 
linear cryptanalysis was described. The simulator is used as a 
tool for intelligent learning of abstract concepts in the design 
and analysis of block ciphers. It allows the students to 
appreciate how computationally intensive the analysis of block 
ciphers are. This simulator now forms an integral,part-of the 
course Advanced Topics in Cryptography which is a part of the 
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an Sbox. 
Fig.3. The simulator displaying a different permutation 
structure. 
154 
Authorized licensed use limited to: RMIT University. Downloaded on November 19, 2008 at 18:13 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply.
j l  i bJ 
. .  
I 
Fig. 4. The dialog box for choosing the Sbox. The choice of the 
permutation is similar. 
._ . I . . _  , .  m* G 
3"BSn-N PFRUUrA7ION LY-TwOI1I 
Plrnl.., .. PI6 
- .  
Fig. 5. Choosing the key bits and the numbemf iterations the 
simulator will use. 
. . .  
. ~\ 
Fig. 6. Simulator reporting the results of cryptanalysis, in a 2 
screen rcport. . .  
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